Patents possibly do (or do not) constitute a source of outstanding information for immunologists. For example, the use of pepsin to digest serum proteins without altering the antitoxin activity of antibodies was a breakthrough discovery by Ivan A. Parfentjev, only described in two patents (US2065196; US2123198) in the 1930s.
A recent patent database survey led us to identify 23 patent families (Table 1) filed on behalf of biopharmaceutical companies in the years 2008-2012, mentioning in their claims or in a particular embodiment of the specification the possibility of ''creating chimaeric antibodies with human Fc regions derived from human IgG1, IgG2, IgG3, IgG4, IgG5, IgG6, IgG7, IgG8, IgG9, IgG10, IgG11, IgG12, IgG13, IgG14, IgG15, IgG16, IgG17, IgG18 or IgG19''. Where do these 15 new IgGs (IgG5 to IgG19) come from? Do they derive from newly described segmental duplications in the IGH locus on chromosome 14? Humans would then become the species with the largest number of IgGencoding genes, outperforming horses, which have only seven IgG subclasses [1] . This bewildering numbering could also result from confusion of IgG subclasses with the IgG allotype numerical system. This hypothesis is, however, unlikely, since IgG allotype numbering is discontinuous, goes far beyond 19, and requires at least one ''m'' character between G and the number (Gm1 to Gm28) [2, 3] .
Despite these patents now dating back several years, there are absolutely no published peer-reviewed data describing more than four IgG subclasses in humans, despite the immunoglobulin heavy constant (IGHC) gene copy number variations observed in healthy individuals with multigene duplications [4, 5] . It is really surprising to see that pending or granted patents refer to IgG subclasses arising from boundless imagination, with the likely goal of freely overextending commercial exclusivity. Why stop at 19 subclasses when one could claim 29 or many more? We do not know whether patent attorneys are now more astute, are now more visionary, or err on the side of caution; however, what is certain is that Köhler and Milstein's institution lacked foresight when it decided not to protect their hybridoma technology. 
